FREMONT, Neb. — A federal agency investigating the fatal explosion at a Fremont biofuels plant is labeling the incident as a “completely avoidable” tragedy.

The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) issued an update on its investigation into the July 29 explosion on Wednesday. The news release said the investigation will look into the operations and conditions at the Horizon Biofuels facility, as well as the dust control systems, industry guidance for safe dust operation, and regulatory oversight.

“This terrible tragedy should not have happened,” said CSB Chairperson Steve Owens. “Preliminary evidence points to a combustible wood dust explosion, a well-known – and completely avoidable -- hazard in wood processing.”  

The release said that when conditions such as dust accumulation, dispersion and ignition occur in a confined space, they can trigger a combustible dust explosion. The explosion that happened on July 29 claimed the lives of Dylan Danielson and his two daughters, Hayven and Fayeah. The release said Danielson was the day shift operator and had brought his daughters to work that day. The girls were in the break room and died in the blast. The release doesn’t specify where Danielson was, but does say he was “trapped inside the collapsed structure and died.”

CSB Board Member Sylvia Johnson said, “The Board is committed to a thorough, independent investigation. We owe it to the victims, their families, and the broader community to identify the root causes and share important safety lessons.”

The release says the Horizon Biofuels facility remains unsafe, which is preventing the CSB from approaching the building.

The CSB’s ongoing investigative actions of the Horizon Biofuels incident  include:

  • Examining the facility’s design, process flow, dust handling, and dust control systems, including cyclones and dust collectors.
  • Assessing whether the facility site operating procedures and practices met safety standards.
  • Interviewing employees, management, first responders, and others knowledgeable about the facility’s operations, maintenance, and safety practices.
  • Reviewing the conditions at the facility and whether prior audits or inspections addressed combustible dust hazards in the facility.

The CSB continues to gather facts and analyze several key areas, including:

  • Cause or probable cause of the initiating dispersion of dust
  • Events and conditions at the facility prior to the incident 
  • Post-incident equipment condition and failure analysis 
  • Properties of combustible wood dust 
  • Industry guidance for facilities that generate wood dust 
  • Regulatory analysis